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s readers know, 2014 marks the 25th anni-
versary of EAP. In celebration, we are 
planning a special fall issue composed of 
commentaries by researchers associated 
with work in phenomenology, broadly; and environ-
mental and architectural phenomenology, specifi-
cally. Depending on the number of commentaries re-
ceived, this special EAP may become a double issue. 
We’ll only know once we begin its assembly, in late 
summer. 
This issue includes four essays. In describing the 
phenomenon of “running-with-a-stroller,” psycholo-
gist Tomoaki Imamichi makes a contribution to 
what might be called “everyday phenomenology.” 
Second, geographer Jacob Sowers draws on a phe-
nomenological approach to explore the unique char-
acter and ambience of southern California’s “Wonder 
Valley,” an unusual place inhabited by three different 
lifestyle groups that Jacobs identifies as “homestead-
ers,” “dystopics,” and “utopics.” 
In the third essay this issue, independent re-
searcher Stephen Wood probes his interest in place 
attachment by examining two lived dialectics: the 
spatial tension between inward and outward aspects 
of place; and the temporal tension between repetitive 
and singular events relating to place. In closing out 
this issue, environmental educator John Cameron 
writes a ninth “letter” from his island home off the 
coast of Tasmania. Drawing on an unusual environ-
mental encounter with 
“phosphorescence,” 
Cameron ponders the 






Left: Coastal scene, 
Bruny Island, Tasma-
nia. See John Cam-
eron’s essay, p. 17. 
This photograph and 
those on p. 19 and p. 
21 are by Vicki King, 
John Cameron’s life 
partner. Other images 
of King’s artistic work 
are included in sev-
eral past EAPs—see 
fall and winter 2012; 









More Donors, 2014 
We gratefully thank the following readers who, since 
the winter 2014 issue, have contributed more than the 
base subscription for 2014: Suzanne Bott; Julio 
Bermudez; Robert Habiger; Robert Mugerauer; 
Jenny Quillien; Justin Winkler; and Craig 
Holdrege and the Nature Institute. 
 
Items of Interest 
The International Coalition of North American 
Phenomenologists (ICNAP) will hold their sixth 
annual conference at St. Louis University in St. 
Louis, Missouri, May 23–25. Committed to facilitat-
ing interdisciplinary connections with original works 
in phenomenology, the group highlights at the sixth 
conference, “Phenomenology and the Social World.” 
The emphasis is “theoretical and applied expositions 
of the social world understood phenomenologically.” 
The conference description reads in part: “The social 
world may be approached as a relational phenome-
non, crated, sustained, and changed by virtue of (1) 
interpersonal relationships; (2) intersubjectivity; (3) 
institutions practices; and (4) as trajectories of histor-
ical and cultural influence.” www.icnap.org/. 
 
The conference, Space and Place: Exploring Criti-
cal Issues, will be held September 3–5, 2014 at 
Mansfield College, Oxford University, Oxford, UK. 
Conference organizers hope to “open a dialogue 
about the politics and practices of space and place.” 
They seek contributions from all disciplines. The 
conference will include traditional papers, paper pan-
els, workshops, and “other forms of performance.” 
Contact organizing chairs Matt Melia and Harris 
Breslow: mattandharris@inter-disciplinary.net; and 
Rob Fisher: sp5@inter-disciplinary.net. 
 
The Nature Institute is offering two summer 
courses for 2014: first, “Reading in the Book of Na-
ture: Enlivening Observation and Thinking through 
Plant Study,” taught by biologist Craig Holdrege, 
science teacher Henrike Holdrege, and artist Pat-
rick Stolfo (June 29–July 5); and “Dynamic Embry-
ology and Morphology,” taught by anatomist Jaap 
van der Wal (July 31–August 3). www.naturein-
stitue.org. 
 
“Human Bodies in Material Space” 
The September 2013 issue of the Journal of Human 
Rights and the Environment focuses on the theme of 
“human bodies in material space.” In her “Editorial,” 
JHRE Editor Anna Grear calls for “a renewing 
transformation of our deepest sense of who ‘we’ are 
as earthlings amongst other earthlings and earth sys-
tems.” One crucial task in the field of law, she sug-
gests is “to create space for the materialities of hu-
man embodied existence—in a lively world of beings 
and systems, scenes and contexts, environments and 
ecosystems—to feature much more potently in our 
ethic-juridical deliberations and structures.” She 
concludes that the articles in this special issue con-
tribute to “a thoroughly embodiment-centered, eco-
logically-open reflection upon human situatedness in 
a vulnerable living order.” 
 Articles in the issue include Haydn Davies’s 
“Environmental Justice and Equal Protection: Intent, 
Motivation and Cognition in Decision-Making”; 
Vito De Lucia’s “Toward an Ecological Philosophy 
of Law: Intent, Motivation, and Cognition in Deci-
sion-Making”; David Seamon’s “Lived Bodies, 
Place, and Phenomenology: Implications for Human 
Rights and Environmental Justice”; and Burns H. 
Weston and David Bollier’s “Toward a Recalibrated 
Human Right to a Clean and Healthy Environment: 





Susan Power Bratton, 2012.The Spirit of the 
Appalachian Trail: Community, Environ-
ment, and Belief on a Long-Distance Hiking 
Trail. Knoxville: University of Tennessee 
Press. 
 
This theologian examines “how long-distance walking might 
enhance spiritual wellness. The research design assumes that 
hikers of different religious preferences, levels of religious 
commitment, and generations may experience a mega-hike or 
extended wilderness sojourn in different ways.” The study con-










Andres Duany and Emily Talen, eds., 2013. 
Landscape Urbanism and its Discontents: 
Dissimulating the Sustainable City. Gabrioa 
Island, BC: New Society Publishers. 
 
This edited collection examines the contentious debate between 
“landscape urbanism” (advocating an emphasis on “ever-evolv-
ing, unstable ecosystems and their rapid changes and dynamic 
oscillations that overturn or rattle longer periods of static equi-
librium”)  and “new urbanism” (a model of community design 
and planning emphasizing walkable, mixed use neighborhoods 
of common architectural style). Contributors to the 18 chapters 
argue for one position or the other (most support new urban-
ism). A few authors suggest that there might be points of agree-
ment between the two approaches, though several contributors 
eschew compromise.  Chapters include “Landscape Urbanism, 
New Urbanism and the Environmental Paradox of Cities” 
(Doug Kelbaugh); “The Social Apathy of Landscape Urban-
ism” (Emily Talen); “Landscape Urbanism: Supplement or 
Substitute?” (Paul Murrain); and “Art Vitiating Life” (Mi-
chael Mehaffy). 
To indicate the lively and often embittered controversy 
running through the volume, we include, in the sidebar, right, a 
portion of landscape critic James Howard Kunstler’s bombas-
tic but entertaining chapter, “The Zombies of Gund Hall Go 
Forth and Eat America’s Brains.” Gund Hall, by the way, 
houses Harvard University’s Graduate School of Design 
(GSD), a primary villain in Kunstler’s account of the situation. 
 
Leif Jerram, 2011. Streetlife: The Untold His-
tory of Europe’s Twentieth Century. NY: Ox-
ford Univ. Press. 
 
This historian “tells the story of Europe’s twentieth century 
from the point of view of the street corners, bars, factories, 
squares and living rooms in which it happened.”  He writes: 
“‘Where’ matters. The physical spaces matter—the layout of 
rooms the relationships of things, the distances between, the 
temperature, the lines of sight. And the values of a place mat-
ter—the ideas it bears, from danger to fun, from sick to healthy, 
from sacred to profane.” Jerram considers five transformations 
“from the point of view of some of the spaces and places which 
dominated that transformation and where the big histories of 
great individuals and the small histories of ‘ordinary ‘people 
came together…”: politics, women’s experiences; culture; sex-
ual identity; and urban design, policy, and planning. 
 
M. Reza Shirazi, 2014. Towards an Articu-
lated Phenomenological Interpretation of Ar-
chitecture. London: Routledge. 
 
This architect draws on the work of Christian Norberg-Schulz, 
Kenneth Frampton, Juhani Pallasmaa, and Steven Holl to con-
sider “the contemporary status of phenomenological discourse 
in architecture.” Shirazi argues that, although there are con-
trasting and sometimes contradictory approaches to “architec-
tural phenomenology,” there are commonalities that he identi-
fies through 36 themes that he describes as “the hidden chain 
that connects all the varieties of architectural phenomenology 
together and constitutes the general structure of the disci-
pline”—e.g., multisensory experience (no. 18), spirit of place 
(no. 27), materiality (no. 33), and phenomenal zones (no. 36). 
 
 
“Menacing porches and picket fences…” 
[An anxiety in relation to the 1990s successes of New Urbanism] was 
most acute at the Harvard Graduate School of Design (GSD), the Vatican 
of modernism. After more than seven decades and countless iterations of 
dogma, and a vast record of built mistakes, it had little left to offer but a 
pretense of ideological correctness, in particular that it represented “the 
cutting edge” of design innovation reaching toward an ever-more tech-
nologically dazzling future. The New Urbanism (NU) especially galled 
it, with its menacing porches and picket fences, those totems of bour-
geois small-mindedness. Eventually, the GSD folk began to grok that the 
NU was about way more than these minor details, but rather a wholesale 
reordering of the human habitat into a coherent and comprehensible de-
sign theory that ran from the relations between buildings to the ordering 
of streets, neighborhoods and regions…. 
 In elite architectural circles, mystification was the supreme 
weapon wielded by their warriors-of-the-cutting-edge. Harvard’s Ae-
gnor at the time was Rem Koolhaas, the Dutch architect who used mys-
tification the way Stanford White had used a T-square. Koolhaas viewed 
the predicaments of overpopulation, resource depletion, financial insta-
bility, and consumerism as fundamentally hopeless, and had adopted the 
career strategy of going with the flow of the entropic zeitgeist, with all 
its delirious confusion. Hence the buildings he designed were intended 
to confound people who used them or saw them, to produce a delicious 
sense of anxiety, the characteristic emotion of the era…. 
 [In 2009, to counter the growing impact of New Urbanism in ur-
ban-design circles], the Harvard GSD found its avatar in Charles Wald-
heim, an associate dean at the University of Toronto, a sedulous contrib-
utor to the professional journals, and an especially deft theorist conver-
sant with all the post-structuralist lingo that had infested the humanities 
and fine arts programs since the 1970s. He had conveniently coined the 
term “Landscape Urbanism” as a way to make the profession [of Land-
scape Architecture] seem more up-to-date, edgy, and sexy, and in him 
Harvard found the perfect field marshal to carve out some of its own 
territory on the battlefield of urban design, where, so far, it had been 
subject only to humiliation. 
 He came out swinging immediately with an overt declaration that 
his new field was a “critique of the disciplinary and professional com-
mitments of traditional urban design and an alternative to ‘New Urban-
ism’.” He accused the NU of failing “to come to terms with the rapid 
pace of urban change and the essentially horizontal character of contem-
porary automobile-based urbanization across North American and Much 
of Western Europe”…. Waldeim assumed that the horizontal spewage 
of sprawl would continue indefinitely and that there was no need to arrest 
it, merely a charge to refine and improve it. He showed next-to-zero 
awareness of the global energy resource quandary, or its relation to the 
disorders of capital formation and all the related dilemmas of epochal 
economic contradiction. 
          In essence, he was enlisted to serve Harvard’s chief institutional 
aim: defense of the status quo, that is, the cherished old dogmas of 
modernism The giveaway was in his statement that LU amounted to “a 
critical and historically informed rereading of the environmental and so-
cial aspirations of modernist planning and its most successful models.” 
—James Howard Kunstler, pp. 125–26; 133–34  
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The World Experienced through a Stroller 
 
Tomoaki D. Imamichi 
 
Imamichi is an Assistant Professor of Psychology at the City University of New York at LaGuardia Community College. 
Specializing in social and environmental psychology, he describes his research interests as “the transformations of person-
environment relations and how people deal with challenging tasks and environments.” As the following essay and 2012 
photograph, below, demonstrate, he enjoys running with his daughters Luna (three years old in 2012) and Stella (one year 
old). The author thanks Dr. Rebio Diaz for his comments and suggestions. imamichi@gmail.com © 2014 Tomo Imamichi. 
 
 
o, I do not ride in strollers. I push them. 
And pushing them changes one’s percep-
tion of the world. To use a phenomenolog-
ical phrasing, it changes one’s way of be-
ing-in-the-world. I experienced this particularly in the 
beginning as I relearned how to navigate the world 
with a stroller—a double stroller, to be exact. The 
world that I took for granted and related to in a non-
self-conscious way—what Heidegger termed 
Zuhanden, or “ready-to-hand”—shifted in a self-con-
scious way to what Heidegger termed Vorhanden, or 
“present-at-hand” (Heidegger 1962). 
When I run with a stroller, stairs become obstacles 
and I look for ramps and elevators. Narrow pathways 
and entrances become challenges. I 
give directed attention to all these 
things I was not concerned with be-
fore, when I ran alone. I’ve quickly re-
alized the importance of universal de-
sign and feel frustrated when the envi-
ronment impedes accessibility. 
 Articles on bicycle commuting 
(Wong 2005) and distance runners 
(Hockey & Allen-Collinson 2006) in-
spired me to explore a phenomenology 
of “running-with-a-stroller.” I exam-
ine this phenomenon via a first-person 
phenomenological method (Seamon 
2000). My phenomenology is colored 
by my multiple identities as a runner, 
scientist, and parent (Rogers 1955). 
What I examine phenomenologically 
is not merely strolling but running 
with a stroller. 
At first, running with a stroller 
seemed inconceivable, since running 
in a city even without a stroller poses many challenges. 
Running-with-a-stroller has allowed me to fulfill mul-
tiple goals more or less simultaneously: I can run, take 
care of the kids (who, I may be projecting, enjoy the 
rides), and give my spouse a break. And I get to ponder 
about things to write. A win-win situation for all par-
ties involved! 
 
unning-with-a-stroller, compared to running-
without-a-stroller, shifts things: Accelerating, 
breaking, dealing with curbs and hills—every 
maneuver requires more physical and psychological 
effort. One’s running route suddenly becomes more 
taxing and complex, particularly uphill and curb-wise. 
 The affordances of a place—i.e., 
the environmental characteristics in-
volving action possibilities (Gibson 
1979)—are perceived differently. One 
example is surfaces, which are not only 
recognized differently but become dif-
ferent surfaces. They activate different 
meanings if traversed with or without 
running with a stroller. Without the 
stroller, my primary concern is “step-
on” and “step-over” convenience, 
which shifts with the stroller to “roll-
on” and “roll-over” convenience, par-
ticularly with curbs and potholes. I must 
also keep in mind “fit-on” and “fit-
through” convenience, particularly with 
poles and narrow sidewalks. 
The world, however, does not con-
sist only of inanimate objects. For an ur-
ban runner, this fact means weaving 
through pedestrians on the sidewalk or 









the street. He estimates both spacing and timing. He 
pays heed to additional weight, length, width, and lim-
ited maneuverability. He is alert to seizing a window 
of opportunity for passability and cross-overability. 
Running-with-a-stroller also requires more personal 
space—the minimal comfortable spacing between 
oneself and others (Hall 1966). I not only adjust by 
giving myself additional space and time. Others give 
me special consideration by offering extra time and 
space because of my status of running-with-a-stroller. 
 
ut it is not just running-with-a-stroller—it is 
“running-with-a-stroller-with-children.” I am 
responsible for my own safety and for the 
safety of my two children. The weight of a stroller-
with-children is not literal but the responsibility for the 
precious cargo. I am physically restrained by the pres-
ence of the stroller and psychologically restrained by 
the presence of the children.  
I am less willing to take risks and am more vigi-
lant of potential dangers. As traffic approaches from 
behind, I listen carefully. I can almost tell the car 
make, its speed, distance, and clearance. Faster speed 
is tolerable if compensated by greater distance, and 
less distance is tolerable if compensated by lower 
speed. My sensing is an integration of auditory infor-
mation, peripheral to semi-peripheral vision, and the 
feel of air turbulence of a passing vehicle.     
Running alone, I accept all kinds of conditions 
that disallow running with the stroller. Extreme 
weather makes the run more risky and subjects my 
children to conditions compromising their comfort, 
despite blankets, warm clothes, and a weather shield 
for the wind, rain, and cold. I cannot judge by my own 
body: As I run and get warm, my passengers may get 
cold, and I cut short my run.  
 
s one accumulates experience running-with-a-
stroller, he learns subtle tricks making the ex-
perience more efficient: reducing time to com-
plete regular routes because he has mastered effective 
ways to navigate an environment that was originally 
“new.” The body-stroller-environment relationship be-
comes second nature. One no longer thinks about 
moves that are now “automatic” and “handy.” One ex-
ample is the “front-wheel-lift” whereby, to make a 
sharp turn, I put my weight on the handle bar to raise 
the stroller’s front wheels. Coupled with a “back-
wheel-lift” quickly following, this front-wheel-lift al-
lows me to conquer curbs, whether up or down. 
As this example suggest, the stroller becomes part 
of my “body-schema”—a pre-reflective awareness of 
my body’s spatial relationships and abilities (Gal-
lagher, 2005). In advanced running-with-a-stroller, the 
body-schema involves my “body-with-the-stroller.” I 
become more aware of what my body-with-the-stroller 
can do. My lived relationship with the stroller shifts 
from a Vorhanden state (where the stroller is perceived 
as an object separate from self) to a Zuhanden state 
(where the stroller and I are “joined”). The stroller be-
comes invisible and recedes into the background, a sit-
uation of mundane technology (Michael 2000). With 
properly inflated tires and correct alignment of the 
front wheel, the stroller rolls almost by itself, particu-
larly on a well-paved street whereby I experience what 
Heidegger called Werkzeugzusammenhang—the syn-
chronicity of experience and technology.     
In many ways, the stroller enhances my running. 
I learn subtle tricks to take advantage of running-with-
a-stroller: As my legs tire, I do “the lean,” putting 
some of my weight on the sides of the stroller’s han-
dlebars to remove a bit of weight from my legs. At 
times, I feel I am not pushing the stroller but that the 
stroller pulls me. In the back pocket of the stroller, I 
store food, drink, and clothing that can be accessed 
without a stop. A perfect tool for a long run. The more 
I become accustomed to running with a stroller, the 
more it seems strange when I run without it! 
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o one is quite 
sure when the 
vast arid land-
scape east of 
Twentynine Palms, Cali-
fornia, first became known 
as Wonder Valley, or even 
exactly why it was named 
such. Interviews and tex-
tual evidence suggest that 
the origins of the commu-
nity’s name perhaps lie 
with Mr. Schooler, a retired 
Marine and one of the first 
residents of the area. It is 
said by some that his de-
scription for the area in the 
late 1950s of “what a wonder of a valley” gained pop-
ularity and eventually was shortened to “wonder val-
ley.” During this time, the area experienced rapid pop-
ulation growth, and residents began to think of them-
selves as living in a defined place—a community en-
clave—within desert space. Somehow, this internal 
cohesiveness and feeling of separateness from neigh-
boring Twentynine Palms, coupled with Schooler’s 
aphorism, led some anonymous individuals in the 
early 1960s to place a sign, “Welcome to Wonder Val-
ley,” on Adobe Road at the eastern city limits of Twen-
tynine Palms. 
Although Wonder Valley’s exact etymology and 
the specific beginnings of community consciousness 
are unclear, it is certain that Wonder Valley and count-
less other western desert communities arose largely 
because of the Small Tract 
Act (STA) of 1938. The 
STA allowed for the dis-
posal of two-and-a-half to 
five-acre allotments of fed-
eral land in the American 
West. The greatest concen-
tration of these tracts was 
released to the public just 
east of Twentynine Palms in 
what is now Wonder Valley. 
It is only in this area that an 
extensive “jackrabbit home-
stead” landscape and a dis-
tinct sense of community 
still exists. 
 
Encounters with Wonder Valley 
I first encountered Wonder Valley in 1994 during 
Christmas vacation as a teenager, when I traveled from 
my Illinois home to my grandparent’s newly restored 
winter house. Because my grandparents met me at the 
Palm Springs airport well after dusk, I was unable to 
view any of the surroundings during the late night ride 
along Highway 62 to their Wonder Valley cabin. 
The following morning I opened the bedroom-
window shades and squinted eastward into the rising 
sun’s nearly blinding glare. I instantly realized I was 
in the midst of a landscape that was completely foreign 
to me. It was during this moment that I first felt the 
paradoxical power of this place. There was just some-
thing about it that both comforted and frightened me—
drew me toward it but also pushed me away. It was 
N 
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strange and yet beautiful. 
During my first time there (as often also happens 
with visitors to Wonder Valley), I became completely 
obsessed with this place. On subsequent visits, my cu-
riosity reached such a vexing crescendo that I decided 
to become a geographer and make studying places my 
profession. Through this focus, I could perhaps un-
ravel the mysterious essence of Wonder Valley and 
other intriguing places. 
Over the next decade as I traveled to other locales 
for study and pleasure, I came to realize that Wonder 
Valley’s place identity had yet to be duplicated. At first 
glance, Wonder Valley’s landscape appeared disar-
rayed and chaotic. Over time, however, I came to rec-
ognize that Wonder Valley had an unexplained order. 
The place is unusual, not because of its disorder, which 
can be expected in a rural desert landscape. Rather, 
Wonder Valley is unusual and thus a place of interest 
because it presents some type of order where one 
would more likely expect chaos—the desert is the ul-
timate manifestation of empty space, and thus many 
times portrayed as the antithesis of place and dwelling. 
Paradoxically, Wonder Valley is out of place 
simply by existing and being a place! As philosopher 
Max Scheler explained, “To find one’s place in the 
world, the world must be a cosmos. In chaos there is 
no place.” In studying Wonder Valley more inten-
sively, I came to realize that the story of this unusual 
community and the accounts of those who call it home 
needed to be explored and better understood (Sowers 
2010).  
 
Modes of Place Identity 
Philosopher Gabriel Marcel contended that individuals 
are not distinct from their place; rather, they are that 
place. To clarify the place identity of Wonder Valley, I 
drew on phenomenological geographer Edward 
Relph’s Place and Placelessness, which provides a 
language whereby I could identify modes of place 
identity and clarify particular place experiences of 
Wonder Valley residents (Relph 1976). In his book, 
Relph described the holistic nature of place as the 
combination of the identity of place (a place’s charac-
ter) and identity with place (intensity of a person or 
group’s lived relationship with place). 
By the identity of a place, Relph referred to its 
“persistent sameness and unity, which allows it to be 
differentiated from others.” Relph described this per-
sistent identity in terms of three components: (1) the 
place’s physical setting; (2) its activities, situations, 
and events; and (3) the individual and group meanings 
generated through people’s experiences and intentions 
in regard to that place. 
In contrast, identity with 
place is our fundamental rela-
tionship with the world around 
us. There are varying modes of 
lived connection we have to the 
places of our world. Some are 
comforting where we find our-
selves at home and develop a 
feeling of insideness. Other 
place situations are unsettling in 
some way, and we experience 
those places as outsiders. There 
are yet other places to which we 
do not attend in a meaningful 
way with the result that a sense 
of placelessness and disinterest 
overtakes our experience. 
Relph developed an in-
sideness-outsideness continuum 
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to describe the everyday relationships that 
people have with place. Relph argued that 
the relationship between insideness and its 
opposite, outsideness, is a fundamental part 
of human experience. Through different de-
grees of insideness and outsideness, differ-
ent places take on different meanings for 
different individuals and groups. Drawing 
on Relph’s conceptual framework, my study 
first focused on describing the varying iden-
tities of Wonder Valley. This explication al-
lowed me to move toward a better under-
standing of residents’ identity with Wonder 
Valley and thus approach Wonder Valley’s 
unique character—the Wonder Valleyness 
of Wonder Valley. In other words, through 
the study of its parts and their interrelation-
ships, I was able to shed light on Wonder 
Valley’s singularity. When I first encoun-
tered this place, I felt it was on the edge of civilization. 
After participating in everyday life and speaking to nu-
merous residents, however, I came to recognize that 
Wonder Valley is actually an overlap of conflicting 
types of place identity held in a complex tension. 
  What are these overlapping identities? My re-
search indicated three types: what I labelled (1) home-
steaders; (2) dystopics; and (3) utopics. I discuss each 
identity type in turn. 
 
1. Homesteaders 
The homesteader identity group partly derives its 
name from the residents themselves. These individuals 
were the first to settle Wonder Valley. They and their 
direct descendants refer to themselves as homestead-
ers, or more precisely, “jackrabbit homesteaders.” 
This group has more in common than just being 
the first families to settle Wonder Valley. These resi-
dents came to a landscape that they saw as neither 
good nor bad but full of potential. By working the 
land—“pushing back nature” and constructing built 
structures—environmental potential was turned into 
an actual, pleasing place. Many homesteaders were 
and are Midwestern retirees who understand the land 
as a blank slate that demands hard work to provide a 
part-time or full-time retreat from cold weather, con-
gested land use, or societal and legal restrictions. 
Drawing on in-depth interviews conducted with 
16 homesteaders,  I came to realize there are two 
homesteader sub-groups: first, the  early homesteaders 
who originally bought land in the 1940s and 1950s; 
and, second, a more recent group coming to Wonder 
Valley in the past ten years to restore older structures 
but who still embody the same homesteader attitude.  
 
2. Dystopics 
The dystopic identity relates to a second group of Won-
der Valley residents and refers to those individuals 
who came to Wonder Valley as a last resort or sought 
it out for nefarious ends. In either case, the individual 
is in some way pushed to the community, views Won-
der Valley as a necessary evil, does not usually engage 
in neighboring, and shapes his or her living or operat-
ing area as a relative disamenity zone. 
Drawing on interviews with seven of these indi-
viduals and other supporting materials, I determined 
that this Wonder Valley identity incorporates three 
subgroups. First, are individuals who, because of high 
housing costs, cannot afford to live “down below” (a 
local term for the Los Angeles basin). These individu-
als still wish to live in southern California and thus 
move to less expensive Wonder Valley. 
A second dystopic subgroup is the homeless and 
mentally unstable relocated to the area through gov-
ernment resettlement programs in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. A third subgroup is a criminal element 
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drawn to the area for two reasons: first, abandoned 
cabins in Wonder Valley provide cover to produce il-
legal drugs; second, Wonder Valley offers easy access 
to the nearby Los Angeles and Las Vegas drug mar-
kets. The situation of this last subgroup can be sum-
marized by the claim that “nature abhors a void, but it 
also seems that abhorrence naturally seeks the void.” 
For the dystopic-identity group, I was only able to 
interview seven individuals, mainly because two of the 
three subgroups were difficult or dangerous to ap-
proach. To resolve this relative lack of representation, 
I interviewed others (e.g., law enforcement officers, 
reporters, and other residents) who had experiences 
with these individuals and had some knowledge of 
dystopic motivations and what their presence has 
meant for Wonder Valley. 
 
3. Utopics 
The third identity group is utopics, who perceive Won-
der Valley as inherently special, fragile, and thus in 
need of protection from destructive uses. These resi-
dents are mostly from Southern California and San 
Francisco. They came to the area in large numbers in 
the 1990s, and their presence continues to grow. Dur-
ing this period, there has been a rebirth of interest in 
California’s desert landscape as a beautiful place, es-
pecially following the creation of the nearby Mojave 
Preserve and the designation of the farther-away 
Joshua Tree National Monument as a National Park. 
After conducting interviews with 13 utopics and 
reviewing other materials, I realized this group incor-
porates three subgroups, the first of which is artists 
who find inspiration in the landscape and cater to art 
collectors. A second utopic subgroup is nature enthu-
siasts who enjoy living in the midst of exotic flora and 
fauna, while a third subgroup is real-estate opportun-
ists who purchase and restore dilapidated houses and 
then resell or rent them as comfortable dwellings 
within a “desert paradise.” I concluded that the parties 
who buy or rent these renovated properties can also be 
considered as representing this third subgroup. 
 
An Existential Ecotone 
American essayist Joan Didion suggested that “a place 
belongs forever to whoever claims it hardest, remem-
bers it most obsessively, wrenches it from itself, 
shapes it, renders it, loves it so radically that he re-
makes it in his own image.” 
In Wonder Valley, however, there is an overlap of 
three identities that struggle in claiming this place for 
themselves. Many communities have various groups 
battling for power, but Wonder Valley is perhaps 
unique because this struggle is its essence. I have 
termed Wonder Valley’s identity an existential eco-
tone—a community based on overlapping, competing 
identities held in precarious tension. Much like a nat-
ural ecotone (for example, a beach or the gradient be-
tween meadow and forest), an existential ecotone is 
home to a fragile diversity. One Wonder Valley resi-
dent described this delicate balance well when he said 
that “The place has not yet become what it is not.” 
As an existential ecotone, Wonder Valley is a par-
adox involving a series of lived contraditions: intensity 
and delicateness; isolation and accessibility; diversity 
and ambiguity. Wonder Valley is paradoxical, yet 
Wonder Valley is also a home, a place, a cosmos 
amidst chaos. The history of Wonder Valley is singu-
lar; its present circumstances, intriguing; and its fu-
ture, a shifting situation of delicate tension. The lived 
relationship of Wonder Valley inhabitants can be de-
scribed as paradoxical insideness—finding at-home-
ness in the midst of tension. I would say, with Mr. 
Schooler, that this place is not only a wonder of a val-
ley but also a wonder of geography. 
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Photograph 1: Cabins dot the Wonder Valley landscape with dry 
Dale Lake and its eastern boundary in the background. 
  
Photograph 2: Two abandoned cabins. Hundreds of cabins like 
these are magnets for residents of the dystopic identity group.  
 
Photograph 3: Central Wonder Valley features the Valley Moun-
tains rising up from the creosote and sagebrush blanketed wash. 
The Bullion Mountains in the far background form the northern 
boundary of Wonder Valley. 
 
All photographs by Jacob Sowers © 2014 and used with permis-
sion. 
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his article describes two of my favorite 
places and considers how my attempts at un-
derstanding my attachment to these places 
have matured. In moving from a quantita-
tive to a phenomenological approach, I have found it 
possible to remain true to place attachment in both its 
spatial and temporal dimensions. 
 
The Public Gardens in Nîmes 
Les Jardins de la Fontaine in Nîmes, France, were 
created in the eighteenth century by the king’s engi-
neer, Jacques Philippe Mareschal (Ville de Nîmes 
2006). His classical construction of symmetrical 
aisles and balustrades dominates the gardens’ plan. In 
the nineteenth century, the gardens were extended fol-
lowing a design by Augustin Cavalier, the town’s 
mayor. He aimed to attract walkers and nature-lovers 
with his sensitive arrangement of Mediterranean trees 
(holm oak, Aleppo pine, cypress) and other plantings. 
My wife had shown me the gardens in Nîmes 
when we started dating in the 1990s. It was with great 
pleasure that we rediscovered them when we came to 
settle in France in 2008. The gardens are anchored in 
her family history, her mother visiting regularly in the 
1950s and bringing her daughters there in the 1970s. 
As part of my effort to truly inhabit Nîmes when we 
moved there, I thought it fitting that I should study the 
gardens, and what better way than via a graduate pro-
gram in environmental psychology at the city’s own 
educational facility—the University of Nîmes!  
It was to the gardens that we turned as first-year 
master’s students in our first lesson of the semester 
dedicated to interviewing. I was delighted. Embarking 
on a daring career change, I received the confirmation 
that I was on the right path. Here I was for the first time 
in my life, developing within the context of a supportive 
group and a university diploma, my sensitivity to the 
particularities of place and person. 
We master’s students divided into groups of two or 
three and entered the gardens. Armed with a set of sim-
ple questions, we set off to gather an initial impression 
of people’s reactions to the gardens and to practice our 
interviewing techniques. An hour later, we returned to 
discuss the experience and our interviewees’ responses. 
Different groups had spontaneously chosen different 
parts of the garden, some in the lower gardens, with 
their typically French classical design and statuary; oth-
ers in the upper gardens, landscaped in the English 
style, with shrubbery, alleys and lawns. 
We sensed a difference in people’s responses to the 
different characters of the gardens’ two halves. The 
lower gardens had a more public face: People coming 
as a family, and the children learning to walk, to cycle 
or to roller skate. In contrast, the upper gardens accom-
modated people seeking privacy, sitting quietly, reading 
a book, or reflecting on things.  
 
 was drawn to environmental psychology because 
of psychologist Stephen Kaplan’s work on the re-
storative benefits of nature (e.g., Kaplan 1995). He 
described how modern work involves a great deal of di-
rected attention and that this faculty becomes easily fa-
tigued. He highlighted the fascination of natural 
places—that they attract our attention without our hav-
ing to direct it and so help our capacity for directed at-









In addition to fascina-
tion, Kaplan went on to enu-
merate three other qualities 
of natural places contrib-
uting to restorativeness. 
First, it is important that a 
place offers a refuge, an op-
portunity to get away. This 
can be as much in a figura-
tive as a physical sense in 
that the place provides experiencers with an occasion 
to step back from what they are involved in and to 
clear their heads. Second, a place must have a suffi-
cient extent and coherence to provide “a whole other 
world,” into which one can be engaged and absorbed. 
Third, the place must be compatible with the activities 
we would wish to carry out and allow one to pursue 
them simply and straightforwardly. 
Environmental psychologist Kalevi Korpela’s 
work on the restorative qualities of favorite places 
awakened me to the idea of place identity—i.e., the 
role that places play in the maintenance of one’s sense 
of self (Korpela and Hartig 1996). Researching the 
idea of identity processes in the psychological litera-
ture, I came to recognize the related duality of in-
sideness and outsideness. Vignoles et al. (2006) speak 
of six identity processes or motives, falling into two 
groups. Belonging, self-efficacy, and self-esteem con-
tribute to identity enactment, while continuity, distinc-
tiveness, and meaning contribute to identity defini-
tion. The enactment of one’s identity is linked to ex-
pansion and outward activity—the expression of 
one’s identity in the social sphere. The definition of 
one’s identity is an inner involvement, bearing on 
one’s sense of the distinctive meaning of one’s life 
over his or her whole history. 
I arranged a meeting with the director of the mas-
ter’s program to start preparing my research project. 
Before enrolling, I had been reading the lecture notes 
she had published on the web, and I was delighted to 
find reference to Kaplan and to the special qualities of 
certain buildings, such as Frank Gehry’s Guggenheim 
Museum in Bilbao. As she and I talked, I brought for-
ward some of my feelings and sensitivities. Her re-
sponse surprised me. In so many words, she said: 
 
“The theory of place attachment is based on the idea, akin to im-
printing in birds, that experiences in a subject’s childhood retain 
a strong influence on their environ-
mental preferences throughout life. 
The theory of spatial determinism ex-
plains how a place may have an effect 
on a person, such as attention restora-
tion. A study of a forest near Paris 
showed that the distance that picnick-
ers walked between the car park and 
where they ate was a function of their 
level of education.” 
 
Listening to these comments, I 
began to lose myself in a maze of theories, causal mech-
anisms, actions, reactions, and relations between ab-
stract quantities. The original experience of the two 
faces of the gardens in Nîmes stayed with me, but my 
research project proposed to objectify that experience 
with all manner of quantitative scales and question-
naires.  
 
olding to the magic of the gardens, I saw a du-
ality in the qualities of restorative places that 
Kaplan had identified. In offering an oppor-
tunity to get away from things and by fascinating us, we 
lose ourselves in a place and are able to recenter our-
selves. In offering extent and compatibility, we have a 
place to explore, where we can engage in activities and 
expand out into the world again. In relation to the Nîmes 
gardens, it seemed to me that the upper face of the gar-
dens encouraged users to turn inward toward the self, 
just as the lower face of the gardens encouraged users 
to turn outward toward the world (Liger 2001, pp. 63–
64). 
As I continued my garden research, I began to feel 
uncomfortable because I felt that I was betraying the 
phenomenon as observed. In my interviews, I had come 
across a group of teenagers who liked to hang out on 
benches at the bottom of the garden shaded by lime 
trees. These young people were seeking a private time 
and place to get away from things and to be among 
friends. This was more an inward-looking activity, even 
though they were in the part of the garden that was sup-
posed to be associated with outward activity. 
At the same time, the upper gardens—associated 
with an inward-looking nature—also contributed to out-
ward-looking activity. This portion of the gardens incor-
porates a hill leading up to the Gallo-Roman watch-
tower, the Tour Magne. I recognized from my own ex-
H 
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perience that the hill provided a challenge to those 
wishing to engage in vigorous exercise—for example, 
running or briskly walking up to the tower and back.  
In becoming more familiar with how visitors 
used the two portions of the gardens, I saw full well 
that people did not fall exclusively into wishing either 
private contemplation or public activity. Rather, many 
users sought out both modes of place experience, yet 
my research method required that I break the whole-
ness of the garden experiences into two separate parts 
that then could be correlated quantitatively. In other 
words, I was arbitrarily reducing the wholeness of the 
garden experiences into two separate parts via which 
I might locate a “counterfeit” wholeness arising from 
statistical correlation (Bortoft 1996, pp. 266–267).  
In the end, my research project collapsed under 
the weight of its forced abstractions and unwieldy 
questionnaires and, with it, my master’s degree and 
daring career change. Three years later, however, I 
saw a call for papers on the personal experience of 
place, and I felt I was given permission to talk again 
of the gardens. The decisive moment, however, was 
the discovery of a new perspective that would bring 
my intuitions into focus. 
 
Systematics & a Spatial Dyad 
It was through EAP Editor David Seamon that I was 
first introduced to systematics, an interpretive method 
developed by the British philosopher J. G. Bennett 
(Bennett 1993). Systematics is based on an apprecia-
tion of the qualitative significance of number, where 
each number—representing a particular system—of-
fers its own unique path for understanding the experi-
ence of a particular phenomenon. As Bennett (ibid., p. 
16) writes, “Systematics illustrates that a particular 
situation can be considered in terms of several differ-
ent systems, depending on one’s viewpoint and under-
standing.” As one-ness and monad, a phenomenon 
can be understood as as unity in diversity; as two-ness 
and dyad, a complementarity of polar opposites; as 
three-ness and a triad, a relation of reciprocal im-
pulses; as four-ness and a tetrad, as transforming ac-
tivity; and so on. 
As I studied Bennett’s systematics method, I was 
completely unprepared for his description of the dy-
adic nature of the home. He draws our attention (ibid., 
pp. 24–25, p. 28) to the: 
inescapable quality of home: its dual function as an inward and 
outward place. When we mention family, shelter, and comfort, we 
speak of the home’s power to gather and hold. But when we speak 
of hospitality or departure and return, we speak of the home’s pow-
ers to relate its dwellers to the larger world…. 
In one sense, it is the “place” into which we enter, but in an-
other sense, it is our “place” from which we move into the world. 
These two meanings permeate the content of a home and point to 
its significance as a dyad: Some elements relate to the home as a 
place of concentration and personal identity, while other elements 
relate to the home as a place of expansion that joins its dwellers 
with the larger society…. 
In this way, we say that a home has two natures, whether they 
be described as inner and outer or private and public. These two 
natures do not divide the home into two parts. One cannot say, 
“This part belongs to the private nature, while this part belongs to 
the public nature.” This statement cannot be true, because if it were, 
we would have two things rather than one. The home would simply 
divide into two parts, each of which would then become a new 
thing in itself. 
 
This dyadic duality of closed/open, inner/outer, and 
private/public related to what I had recognized in the 
interviews with garden users. The complementarity of 
“concentration and personal identity” and “expansion 
… [into] larger society” was what I had sensed in 
Kaplan’s account of attention restoration and in Vi-
gnoles and colleagues’ identity processes. 
Bennett’s interpretation of home suggested that the 
comfortableness that one feels in a restorative place 
comes from a complementarity of enfolding and ena-
bling. On one hand, we feel sheltered, able to rest, to get 
away, to rediscover a sense of meaning in our lives, our 
distinctness, and our continuity. On the other hand, we 
are given a stepping-off point into the wider world; we 
can expand in activities of our choice; we feel proud in 
our sense of self-efficacy and belonging in the larger so-
ciety. 
 
ennett’s interpretation helped me understand 
why my master’s project had failed. In my ana-
lytical approach, I wrongly separated the public 
and private natures of the gardens into two separate 
parts. It was as if, when visiting a human home as a 
space alien, I was struck by the private nature of the 
bedroom, and the public nature of the sitting room, and 
decided that these were two separate places with two 
separate functions that would attract different kinds of 









there is nothing whatever that is 
not concerned with [the home’s] 
nature as a private place. At one 
moment, the door and chairs 
welcome guests but, at other 
moments, secure the home from 
the public world and contribute 
to a place of retreat. Yet there is 
also nothing in the private nature 
of the home that is not related to 
its other nature as a place that 
belongs to the world. Even the 
most protective parts of the 
home contribute to its ability to 
play a public role, particularly as these parts help renew family 
members and give them restored energies to face again the out-
side world. 
 
In a flash, I saw a link to the themes that Seamon 
developed in his Geography of the Lifeworld (Seamon 
1979), namely movement, rest, and encounter. A place 
invites us to both inward stability and outward move-
ment. The balance between the two makes possible a 
deepening encounter with the place, where we be-
come more attentive to and aware of its character. In 
a more authentic encounter, we move from habituality 
to openness. The terms “closed/open” and “in-
ner/outer” are those of a spatial dyad. The terms aim 
to convey the nature of a place’s expression in space 
and the nature of its immediate invitations and disclo-
sures to us. 
Thanks to Bennett’s systematics, I have at last 
been able to tease out the intuition that we as a class 
had in relation to the garden interviews. To talk of 
shared intuition may seem strange, but that was what 
I witnessed when we students came back from our 
garden interviews. Fresh from our experience in the 
gardens, we compared notes and a pattern emerged, a 
collective seeing of structure. That is phenomenology: 
The phenomenon spoke directly to us, disclosed itself. 
This disclosure refused to be split into the personal 
and the collective, the subjective and the objective. 
 
A Temporal Dyad 
As I’ve pondered the Nîmes gardens from a systemat-
ics perspective, I’ve also come to realize a temporal 
dyad that complements the spatial dyad described 
above. In one of the garden interviews, a lady re-
marked that she had come to the gardens as a child, a 
mother, and a grandmother. In short, the gardens 
played an important role in 
her family history (as they 
had in my wife’s). This set me 
reflecting on the importance 
of place for me and my family 
when I was growing up. 
In 1966 before I was 
born, my family moved to 
Bath, England. With its gentle 
rolling hills, Georgian archi-
tecture, and soft, yellowish, 
local stone, Bath is a beautiful 
town. My parents had come back to London after their 
years working abroad in Cyprus and Nigeria. They were 
only too happy to swap a capital city for a provincial 
town. 
My memories mostly start from when we moved 
into a large Georgian terraced house in Widcombe, lo-
cated not far from where the River Avon meets a canal. 
Completed in 1810, the 57 miles of this canal connect 
the Avon in Bath to the Kennet in Newbury (British Wa-
terways 2011). The Avon runs west to Bristol, while the 
Kennet flows east where it joins the Thames on its way 
to London. Barges were thus able to travel the 87 miles 
from port to port. 
The canal, left disused since the advent of the rail-
ways, naturally lent itself to leisure use. Barges were 
originally towed from a path, by man or horse. Once re-
stored, the towpath provided a natural footpath at the 
water’s edge. To this day, the canal provides a pleasant 
setting for many different activities—boating, cycling, 
walking, and picnicking. Created before steam and the 
petrol engine, the canal retains a certain harmony with 
nature and indeed has become an important habitat for 
wildlife. The cast iron bridges and lock gates only add 
to the canal’s beauty. 
As the canal runs through the town, it offers a pleas-
ant alternative route from one place to another. It was 
constructed at a higher level than the center of Bath, so 
gives one that sense of being away, allowing one to gain 
a fresh perspective on things. There is much to draw the 
eye: the slow movement of the water, the occasional 
barge passing through a lock, the reeds and waterside 
trees, the different stretches of water, of all different 
shapes and sizes, not to the mention the wildlife—mal-
lard, swans, moorhens, seagulls and the occasional 
heron. 
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Even before I was born, the Bath waterways had 
become an integral part of my family’s daily routines. 
Walking home from primary school, I had the choice 
to take either the river or the canal home. My second-
ary school was not far from Sydney Gardens, the pub-
lic gardens constructed over the canal. My father’s 
work was a little farther on, so for many years we 
started our day walking together by the waterside on 
the way to our duties.  
Running for miles, the canal offers a rich extent 
to explore, a diversity of habitats, and lends itself to 
trials of endurance. When we moved to Bathampton, 
I challenged myself first to walk all the way to Limp-
ley Stoke, and later, as far as Avoncliff and back. With 
each new destination achieved, I embraced with con-
fidence new territories of my inner landscape. It is 
clear that the canal is a restorative place. In its com-
plementarity of public and private, enabling and en-
closing natures, we see again the terms of the spatial 
dyad. It is not surprising, therefore, that we were 
drawn into a deep encounter with the place as a fam-
ily, during the time of our 30-year association with 
Bath.  
 
et me recount some memories of the canal that 
became woven into my personal and family 
history. For instance, there was one stretch of 
water along the canal where we regularly watched 
tufted ducks diving. One day I was surprised and de-
lighted to see that they were joined by goldeneyes. 
Another time, I saw a strange bird I did not recognize, 
looking like a duck, but perching in a tree. My sister 
sketched it, noting its particularities, so we could later 
identify it at home. I regularly saw black-headed gulls 
on the canal, their plumage changing from summer to 
winter. In summer, their heads were a lovely chocolate 
brown (not black, as their name would suggest!). In 
winter, they had just a dark spot next to the eye. One 
time, I saw 50 in one stretch of water. My mother said 
there must have been a storm at sea that day. 
There were other changes related to the sea-
sons—for instance, the male mallards emerging in 
spring from their dusky eclipse into their bright breed-
ing plumage, soon to be followed by ducklings. Moor-
hens created their untidy stick-and-leaf nests and 
tended their eggs, from which their scraggly young 
would hatch. 
There was one particular spot where, year after 
year, my father and I saw a swan nesting and raising her 
cygnets. My father was upset when the owner of the 
nearby house began tending the grass as his own, and 
the swan and her cygnets disappeared. We had some 
harsh winters as I was growing up, particularly in 1982. 
In those times, the canal would freeze over. With my 
sisters, we laughed to see ducks coming into land and 
slipping and sliding on the ice. 
When my parents left Bath, one of my sisters gave 
my mother a watercolor of one of the cast iron bridges 
across the canal. For me, this painting summed up the 
canal and, with it, the whole of Bath. As proof of what 
the canal meant to her, my mother hung the painting 
next to one representing Cyprus, the place that had most 
touched her heart in her life overseas. 
 
s this account suggests, our memories refer, on 
one hand, to stability: to the unchanging land-
scape, the predictable rhythm of the seasons, 
the recurrent changes in the plumage of birds, the arrival 
of mating season, nest making, rearing of young, and, 
finally, the turn to winter. On the other hand, our mem-
ories refer to unusual events punctuating the natural 
equilibrium: to the arrival of a less-often-seen species, 
a sudden abundance of another, a particularly harsh 
winter, the amusing behavior of ducks landing on ice. 
Sometimes, these unusual events rupture the previous 
stability and upset the recurrence of a happy event as 
when the homeowner annexed the grassy bank that had 
been the swan’s nesting place. 
Here, I believe we have a temporal dyad, with a 
complementary tension between stable recurrence and 
singular occurrence. In other words, shared memories 
of a place incorporate a combination of “that always 
used to happen” plus “remember that time when...?” 
This combination of repetitive and unusual events pow-
erfully contributes to the memory of a place. 
 
The Mundane and the Festive 
The upper gardens in Nîmes are arranged so that the 
walker climbing up one of the multitude of paths arrives 
at a number of plateaux on his way to the Tour Magne. 
Each plateau provides a contrast with the narrow paths 
and offers visitors a chance to admire the view of the 
town below. On one of these plateaux is a beautiful pond 









trickling into it from above. This was one of favorite 
garden spots where, along with many local children, I 
enjoyed the game of spotting frogs hiding among the 
reeds and lilies. When we first moved to Nîmes, I 
came to the gardens almost every day. In spring and 
summer, the pause by the pond became part of my 
daily routine. 
After I started the master’s program in environ-
mental psychology, I still returned to the pond. One 
day I had a surprise. Two snakes emerged from reeds 
on the far bank and glided over each other before slip-
ping back into the water. I was amazed. Never before 
had I seen water snakes there. For me, they were a 
rarity and here they were slithering in shimmering sil-
ver right before my eyes. 
I could simply cite this experience as another ex-
ample of an unusual occurrence standing out against 
a stable background of recurrence. But the experience 
had an additional quality that points to its richer sig-
nificance. I felt honored that the gardens had offered 
me the gift of seeing the water snakes. I felt special, 
with a renewed sense of my personal being. The gar-
dens had spoken to me! Here was a moment of stand-
ing back, of wonder, of celebration. To use the terms 
of phenomenological psychologist Bernd Jager, my 
experience had crossed the threshold from the mun-
dane to the festive. 
 
ager (1997) described the mundane and the fes-
tive as two complementary qualities of experi-
ence that he first recognized in the rural Holland 
of his childhood. He observed that, on the day of rest 
from work, his father joined the local farmers as they 
returned to their fields to survey, to discuss, and to en-
joy their lands. He noticed their very gestures 
changed, their posture, even their dialect. He could 
never quite believe the conventional explanations he 
was given of the necessity of this day of rest—to re-
charge and to return rested and refreshed to the fields. 
These explanations seemed to imply that rest was 
simply a reduction of the quantity of work and would 
allow the body, as with a machine, to recover its ca-
pabilities. Jager sensed that there was a deeper reason. 
He related how Sunday was different experientially 
from the regular workdays of the week. 
For a more appropriate explanation, Jager turned 
to the biblical account of Creation in Genesis. At the 
end of each day of Creation, there is a pause: “And 
God saw that it was good.” This phrasing marks a 
threshold between the day of work and the moment of 
standing back and celebrating that work. The Sabbath 
then becomes the completion of these moments, mark-
ing off the time of ordinary work from a time of con-
templation and rejoicing. 
Even if people are charged with the duty of mun-
dane work, as stewards of the land, it is in the festive 
that individuals come into their own. A baby feeds, but 
a child eats. Jager explained that weaning is the moment 
when the infant enters fully into the human community. 
Feeding is simply the mechanical act of eating; the 
chewing, digesting, and assimilating is the very essence 
of the transformation of nature that takes place during 
mundane work. When the weaned child is invited to 
take part in eating, there is a shift to grace and cere-
mony, attention to others, and conversation. In experi-
encing a meal, a host prepares and the guests share, each 
welcomed and celebrated as a unique person. In turn, 
the infant’s sucking becomes the child’s speaking; and 
the infant’s grasping, the child’s greeting. 
The festive does not seek to remove the mundane 
but infuses it with deeper meaning. The manual and 
mental dexterity that allows us to “come to grips” with 
the quotidian world, shaping it to our needs, is balanced 
with the sense of the festive that respects and cherishes 
the world (Jager 1997, pp. 13–14, p. 15). The modern 
world, however, seeks to abolish the festive and absorb 
it into the mundane world of science and technology: 
“Eating becomes fueling a biochemical organism, sex-
uality becomes an exchange of bodily fluids, host and 
guest relations become a mask for what in reality are 
power relations that grow out of the biological need to 
survive” (ibid., p. 7). 
 
n mundane terms, the Nîmes gardens were simply a 
stable background—a place that accompanied me in 
my daily activities. In the moment of revelation, 
when I saw the water snakes, I felt suddenly that I was 
the gardens’ guest and they my host. In this festive mo-
ment, the gardens made themselves known to me per-
sonally. I felt renewed in my sense of personal being. It 
is only from the threshold of the festive that persons and 
things appear as actively manifesting themselves. No 
aspect of reality comes fully into its own until it has 
been greeted, contemplated and blessed; until it has 
been given the space and time to fully appear and be 









As the spatial character of natural surroundings is 
restorative for human beings, so is their temporal 
character. The structure of quotidian and unusual 
events leads to an experience of the festive, where 
place and person come into their own. The fact that 
certain species of plants and animals are common and 
others rare adds to the temporal fabric, where certain 
species will be more regularly seen than others. Envi-
ronmental activist George Monbiot (2013) criticizes 
conservation efforts that attempt to make rare species 
common. We can see in such efforts the spread of the 
mundane. The common is more readily assimilated to 
the mundane, but the rare remains wild, aloof. In the 
mundane, everything is to be tamed. Nothing is wild, 
nothing is “other.” In the festive, distinctions are cel-
ebrated. Self and other are each appreciated as differ-
ent and in that difference seen as giving value to each 
other. 
Jager makes clear that our desire for inhabitation, 
which I felt so strongly in Nîmes, can only be fulfilled 
by being open to this dimension of the festive: 
 
It is ultimately by virtue of this festive light that we feel invigor-
ated in our desire to inhabit the earth, and that it becomes possi-
ble for us to feel truly at home in the world. It is this light of the 
festive that gives a unique presence to whatever it illuminates. It 
is what makes a particular landscape unforgettable and irreplace-
able. We may long for a garden, a house, a landscape of our 
youth, the same way that we long for a person we once knew and 
loved, because both once welcomed us, and both made their ap-
pearance within the light of the festive. By opening the register 
of the personal, the festive makes it possible for us to recognize 
a landscape as we would an old friend, it permits us to experience 
trees as offering us their shade, as paths inviting us to explore the 
hills, or cool streams as bidding us to take a rest at the water's 
edge (ibid., p. 36). 
 
The Mundane & Festive as Renewal 
Bennett’s systematics is an interpretive method that 
aims to be true to the richness of the phenomenon as 
it discloses itself as a sequence of systems each char-
acterized by a different number—oneness, twoness, 
threeness, and so forth. In this essay, I have suggested 
how a systematic understanding of the dyad helped 
me to understand my intuitions concerning my favor-
ite places. The spatial character of a place—its open 
and closed areas, its inner and outer qualities—con-
tributes to its restorativeness. The temporal character 
of place—a relatively stable background of recurrent 
situations punctuated by singular events—provides 
the basis for an experience of the mundane and the fes-
tive, which leads to a renewal of personal identity. A fa-
vorite place, in other words, facilitates a restoration of 
one’s identity. 
These spatial and temporal dyads were both con-
tained in the initial experience of the Nîmes gardens, 
shared with my fellow students, in that first interview-
ing exercise. The spatial character of the gardens was 
revealed via the different responses that participants 
gave depending on whether they were queried in the 
lower or the upper gardens. The temporal character of 
the gardens was intimated via the lady who described 
how she had come to the gardens as child, mother, and 
grandmother. The two dyads were both present in one 
place, on one morning. This was, to quote Goethe, “an 
instance worth a thousand, bearing all within itself” 
(Bortoft, 1998, p. 292). 
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or the first time since we have been on Bruny, 
I’ve had a month on my own at Blackstone. 
Even though we often spend much of each 
day separately, it’s different when Vicki is not 
here at mealtimes to discuss the condition of the fields 
or the wildlife we have seen. Through her absence, I 
realize it is a mundane but vital aspect of inhabiting the 
place jointly, this daily exchange of events and talking 
through what needs doing. Sense impressions seem so 
much more acute and encounters with animals so much 
more intense without Vicki’s mediating presence. 
I can also take advantage of being solo by acting 
more spontaneously. One evening, though it was cool, 
cloudy, and windy, I lit a fire on the beach and had a 
simple dinner. I took my oyster-collecting gear 
(gloves, rusty screwdriver, and collecting bowl), an old 
grill rack, two lamb chops, a billycan to heat water, and 
a loaf of bread. Because Little Blackstone beach is nes-
tled in a small shoreline indent, conditions are often 
calmer and warmer than up at the house. I gathered 
some oysters, driftwood, and three large stones on 
which to balance the grill. 
One of the simpler pleasures of life is sitting by a 
campfire with a billycan boiling for tea, dinner sizzling 
on the grill, and bread toasting over the fire. Not that it 
was pure pleasure—the breeze shifted at times to give 
me an eyeful and lungful of smoke, and I managed to 
blacken rather than toast my first slice of bread. These, 
however, are minor matters. After the food was 
cooked, I built the fire up to a merry blaze and settled 
down with my dinner to watch the flames burn down. 
 
 
s the light faded on that grey evening, I mused 
over the number of times I had gazed into the 
embers over the years. As a teenager escaping the tedium 
of middle-class life in Canberra, I went hiking and camp-
ing in the Brindabella Ranges, returning feeling revital-
ized and wilder, less tamed. That set a pattern for my 
adult life, to “go bush” whenever I could. When I taught 
my “Sense of Place” course at university, I took my stu-
dents on overnight trips into the Blue Mountains and, on 
one occasion with Vicki, a three-week trek into Central 
Australia. Conversations after dinner when we were 
clustered around the fire under a sandstone overhang or 
sprawled on a dry riverbed were more wide-ranging and 
reflective than those in the classroom. It was far easier 
to talk of connection with “country” and to give voice to 
place. 
One of the luxuries of having a beach fire is not hav-
ing to worry about flames spreading to surrounding grass 
or trees, so I laid some lengthy pieces of driftwood 
across the fire. As evening darkened into night, I still had 
quite a bit of wood half-burned, and I began to feel fidg-
ety about how long this would take. I had a good book 
back at the house, it was getting late, why not pour water 
on the fire and call it a night? But I felt curiously reluc-
tant to kill the flames, so I watched as their flicker edged 
in blue gradually gave way to deepening red embers. I 
hunched down closer to the warmth of the little pile of 
coals. When I sensed another source of light on the hori-
zon, I looked up and felt a reverse sense of vertigo as my 
field of vision expanded rapidly from a small glowing 
circle two feet away to the entire night sky with a rising 
crescent moon skating between the clouds, and slender 
eucalypt branches steepling above me. 
As the coals winked into greyness and a bank of 
cloud obscured the moon, I stirred myself and took my 









greenish sparks ignited in the water. Phosphorescence! 
We had seen it only twice before, but never this early 
in the year. I fetched a stick, gave it a vigorous swirl 
and saw long lines of light in the inky water. 
After dousing the fire, I deliberated. Do I go up, 
fetch the kayak paddle and head out onto the water as 
Vicki and I had done once before? It was late now, I 
was sleepy, the heavier cloud had brought a stiffer 
wind, it was cold, it might rain, if anything happened 
to me out on the water, I was really on my own…. 
 
till vacillating, I went up to the house, retrieved 
the paddle, released the kayak from its tethering 
chain, and slid it into the water. The first few 
strokes told me that I had made the right choice. On 
the upstroke, emeralds dripped off the blade. As I ac-
celerated, luminescence streamed off both sides of the 
prow, startling in its brilliance against the black sea and 
sky. 
After ten minutes, I stopped paddling away from 
the shoreline. Out here in the Channel, the wind had 
stirred up choppy water. Every wavelet, as it broke, 
emitted a spurt of luminous foam. As the kayak rocked 
from side to side, I was surrounded by breaking 
patches of light in every direction. This remarkable 
sight stirred a memory in me. The night after a big 
bushfire had burned right down to the water directly 
opposite us, Vicki and I went down to the shore and 
watched the reflections in the water as spot fires flared 
and died in the smoky gloom right along the peninsula. 
Fire in the water. 
Seeking calmer water, I paddled to Woodcutter’s 
Point. As soon as I steered into the lee, the choppiness 
subsided and I paddled slowly, appreciating the still-
ness after the tumult and the light show in the middle 
of the Channel. As I eased closer to shore, I could make 
out what looked like cloudy luminosity in the depths 
of the water. Even when I stopped the kayak directly 
above it, my eyes couldn’t focus. It was a stark contrast 
with the sharply defined emerald light arcing through 
the dark that I had earlier encountered. Was there 
something luminous below the surface or was I imag-
ining it? 
Tentatively, I reached out with my paddle and 
dipped it below the surface. It contacted something 
heavy yet yielding. I pulled upward sharply and there 
was an explosion of emerald light like fireworks in the 
night sky, then long strings of light that extended down 
into the water, slowly fading. After a moment’s stunned 
incomprehension, I recognized a large clump of seaweed 
on the end of my paddle. The phosphorescence must 
have accumulated in its long strands and luminesced 
brilliantly when I shook it, but otherwise gave off a soft 
light as it moved in the currents of the sea. 
I peered entranced over the side of the kayak. Even 
though I had an explanation of what I was seeing, it 
seemed as though I was looking into the night sky, with 
strings of nebulae spread across the expanse with vast 
cloudy constellations reaching into infinite space. The 
wind dropped completely, and I sat motionless, sus-
pended over the cosmos. It was late, pitch dark. I was 
lost in wonder, alone on a length of uninhabited coast.  
I was shaken from my galaxy gazing when the prow 
of the kayak struck an oyster-encrusted rock. I looked up 
and again had the vertiginous sense of rapid readjust-
ment of my visual field. What seemed like fathomless 
depths was probably only a meter of water. I pushed my-
self back out and lingered, drawn again into the web of 
ghostly points of light. Eventually, I collected my scat-
tered wits and paddled back close to the shore, musing. 
 
everal aspects of the evening invite further reflec-
tion. One is that I very nearly missed out on wit-
nessing this phenomenon. There were two key 
choice points when I almost decided to return to the 
house. In both moments, it would have been a reasonable 
decision because it was late, cold, and windy. I remem-
ber telling myself it was silly to watch the fire die right 
down just on principle—that I should take account of the 
conditions. If I look a little more closely at my wanting 
to stay longer around the fire or to take the kayak out, 
part of it has to do with being on my own and taking 
risks. Even more significant, however, was my not wish-
ing to cut across a natural process already underway. It 
felt somehow disrespectful to the fire to pour water on 
the sticks when they had more heat and ruby light to of-
fer.  
Susan Murphy writes of “accepting all offers,” a 
phrase that originates from improvisational drama, and 
is the way of Zen itself [1]. Life is continually providing 
invitations to enter more deeply into a situation, which 
one can either accept or reject. Most of her examples 
come from human interactions and often involve ac-
ceptance of suffering, but surely the same is true of the 









the fire. Accepting that offer led to the subsequent in-
vitation to go out onto the water.  
Accepting this second opportunity, I then entered 
into the gift cycle, in which what might have been 
merely an attractive sight when viewed from the shore 
was transformed into something more mysterious that 
is still working its magic on me. From this perspective, 
it is a different sort of choice. If I see it as a matter of 
rationally choosing one action over another, my deci-
sion refers solely to my own needs and wants. If I ask 
what place-based processes are occurring that include 
me, then it is more a matter of letting go—looking to 
see where the situation leads me. It is still a choice I 
make, of course, but there is a qualitative difference 
when I choose to let go, because it is more inclusive of 
other beings. 
I am left wondering. How many other occasions 
have I not recognized as an invitation? Or the possibil-
ity occurred to me, and I sensed that a door might open, 
but it was not convenient because I had other things to 
do? Probably thousands. 
They may not neces-
sarily have led to such 
wondrous experiences 
as the phosphorescence, 
but I’ll never know. All I 
can do is be as open as I 
can to unexpected invi-
tations offered from un-
likely sources. 
Another aspect of 
my beach experience 
was disruption of my 
perceptual scale. When I 
was huddled over the 
fire, my entire focus was 
on a small bed of coals. 
For several hours, this 
was my world, steadily 
deepening red, shot 
through with flickers of 
flame, tiny jets of gas, 
and charred sticks seg-
menting into embers 
edged in ash. The moon-
light breaking through 
the clouds shifted my 
visual field instantly to a vaster scale—the entire night 
sky with the moon and stars filtered through the looming 
trees. Out on the water, I experienced abruptly shifting 
scales from several feet of water to vast depths of space. 
 
n The Spell of the Sensuous, philosopher David 
Abram writes of a related, but more disorienting, ex-
perience. Standing at night in Bali amidst a patch-
work of rice paddies, he finds himself surrounded by 
star-studded space and its reflection: 
 
Between the constellations below and the constellations above 
drifted countless fireflies, their lights flickering like the stars…. I 
felt myself at times falling through space, at other moments floating 
and drifting. I simply could not dispel the profound vertigo and gid-
diness; the paths of the fireflies, and their reflections in the water’s 
surface, held me in a sustained trance [2]. 
 
It may not be coincidental that bioluminescence, 
this time in the form of fireflies, played a pivotal role in 
disrupting normal perception. The power of experiences 
such as these propelled Abram into his phenomenologi-
cal exploration of sensory 
reciprocity with the more-
than-human world. The 
latter part of my evening 
was characterized by the 
play between explanation 
and a sense of wonder, 
which brings together ele-
ments of both choice and 
scale. Because of every-
thing that had happened 
previously, my initial real-
ization of the phosphores-
cence in the seaweed 
didn’t entirely dispel the 
feeling that I was gazing 
into clouds of constella-
tions. Having sat for hours 
by the embers, I was per-
haps more open to sitting 
in reverie out on the water. 
I am reminded of the 
dynamic between eros and 
logos in relation to gifts of 
place [3]. Although poet 
and writer Lewis Hyde 
I 
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warns that being too concerned with explanations and 
causes (the domain of logos) can overwhelm the imag-
inative and mysterious powers of eros, it seems to me 
that the two were co-existing nicely that night. As I 
“saw” the depths of the cosmos beneath my kayak, I 
didn’t forget that it was luminescent seaweed. Rather, 
I responded to the invitation to enter more deeply into 
the phenomenon as perceptual experience. Perhaps 
more to the point, I willingly entered into the play be-
tween the two. After the initial shock of my kayak’s 
hitting the rock, I stayed on, fascinated. Indeed, was it 
precisely because of the disjunction between sensory 
appearance and physical reality that I was so intrigued? 
I looked up bioluminescence in my Encyclopedia 
Britannica. The article’s author noted the difficulties 
in discerning what the function of luminescence might 
be in simple organisms such as the dinoflagellates that 
cause phosphorescence in ocean waves. “It has been 
suggested,” he writes, “that the bioluminescent reac-
tion was originally used to remove oxygen toxic to 
primitive types of bacteria that developed during a 
time when oxygen was absent or very rare in the 
Earth’s atmosphere” [4]. These protozoans have sub-
sequently developed ways of using oxygen but have 
retained the luminescent capability for reasons un-
known. If this suggestion is correct, it means that phos-
phorescence is a very ancient phenomenon, since oxy-
gen entered Earth’s atmosphere in abundance two and 
a half billion years ago. 
Far from dispelling a sense of wonder, I find this 
possible explanation of phosphorescence’s original 
function quite astounding. The thought that, for the 
past several billion years, these simple creatures have 
been emitting light when agitated stirs my imagination, 
especially when I consider that it might literally be an 
afterglow of an era when what is essential to life to-
day—oxygen—was originally toxic. It is a reminder of 
the barely conceivable antiquity of protozoan life on 
Earth, and it added another dimension to my reflec-
tions. Not only was I peering into apparent expanses of 
space, I was looking back into deep time [5]. 
 
he following month, Vicki and I visited Tasma-
nia’s recently-opened Museum of Old and New 
Art (MONA), the largest private museum in the 
Southern Hemisphere and home to a stunning collec-
tion of antiquities provocatively juxtaposed with con-
temporary paintings, sculptures, and art installations. I 
was intrigued by Gregory Barsamian’s sculpture Artifact 
2010, a huge metallic human head laid on its side with 
small apertures so that the viewer can peer into the work-
ings of the “brain.” Inside were flashing lights illuminat-
ing images of books with pages turning that became yel-
low-winged birds. Falling ripe apples changed into nuts 
that liquefied and flowed through disembodied hands. 
Colors filled and emptied out of hats, and wire spooled 
everywhere in the flickering, confusing interior. 
Every visitor to MONA is given an iPod that has in-
formation and commentary, so I clicked on an audio con-
versation with Barsamian, who discussed the relation-
ship between sensory experience and explanation. I was 
so struck by his words that I looked around in the cav-
ernous space for somewhere to sit and listen: 
 
Rational thought is a very slow-moving activity; it happens at about 
the speed of speech, which is about 15 to 20 bits per second, when 
the senses are pouring 20 million bits per second into your mind. 
You’re processing huge amounts of it and acting on a lot of it with-
out ever being remotely conscious of it…. If you have an idea and 
you can explain it, by all means just explain it, but so much happens 
outside that realm, that’s beyond explanation, that can come into 
you directly through your senses…. [People] think they’re the oper-
ator sitting in the driver’s seat of this “flesh buggy” [the body] and 
directing it to do things, when there is this mile-wide river of infor-
mation flying by, and they are experiencing a large amount of it, but 
their consciousness is only dipping in a finger here and there, and 
claiming to know what’s happening in the river or, with further con-
ceit, to be in control of what’s happening in the river. And it’s really 
nonsense [6]. 
 
It’s not news we are bombarded with a vast amount 
of sensory input. As I viewed Barsamian’s installation, 
however, I was strongly affected by the comparisons he 
was making, especially as it was the very topic I had 
been pondering so recently. MONA’s setting contributed 
to the effect—three stories underground in a vast open 
space with flickering, flashing lights emanating from the 
apertures of the giant metallic head juxtaposed (at the 
time) with slabs of hanging raw meat, an enormous 
snake mural, a bulbous red sports car, and exquisite dis-
play cases of Greek and Egyptian antiquities. An equally 
diverse medley of clicks, thumps, machine noises, muf-
fled music, and rhythmic swooshing of an interrupted 
fall of water bounced off the rock walls. I felt dazed. The 
puniness of my conscious mind to make sense of this be-
wildering array of sensory material was sobering. 
Mechanically-produced flashing lights in a metal 
sculpture are considerably different from the natural 
T 
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cence and the flickering of fire-
flies, yet there is one essential 
element in common—rapidly 
alternating flashes of light can 
induce an altered state of con-
sciousness. It is one of the ways 
used for hypnosis—aspects of 
waking consciousness are by-
passed. Writers like Aldous 
Huxley have noted that the re-
sultant trance-like state is 
sometimes an opening of a door 
that normal consciousness 
keeps closed, though this is a 
matter of some dispute [7]. 
 
 returned to Blackstone 
with relief, letting my eyes 
rest on the patterns of tidal 
currents on the Channel and relaxing into the sound of 
the softly breaking waves.  My thoughts, however, 
were stimulated by my visit to MONA. For one thing, 
I began to think differently about the relationship be-
tween imagination and explanation, or between logos 
and eros. Lewis Hyde views it as a dynamic between 
two equal, or at least commensurate, opposing forces 
at work in the world. The implication of Barsamian’s 
perspective is that the force of logos is very slow, op-
erating on a “narrow band width.” Eros, with its con-
nection to the unconscious and the imaginal realm, is 
more directly in touch with sensory experience, which 
is a million times faster, on a broader band width and, 
therefore, vastly more powerful [8]. 
From this point of view, I could say that, during 
my kayaking experience, I pulled myself out of deeper 
immersion in the vast flow of the senses, slowed things 
down to thinking speed and “caught my breath” before 
plunging back in. There is a trap, however, in Barsa-
mian’s use of the million-fold difference in speed be-
tween rational cognition and sensory experience. It 
makes logical thought seem insignificant, almost irrel-
evant. In fact, part of his argument as an artist is to 
overthrow the hegemony of the intellect, particularly 
the tendency of critics to over-analyze an artwork, 
thereby diminishing its experiential power. 
I’m more interested in the 
positive dynamic between expla-
nation and imagination, even af-
ter the former is put in its place as 
being much slower and having ac-
cess to less information. In “Sev-
enth Letter from Far South,” I ar-
gued that Hyde takes an overly 
negative view of the interaction of 
logos and eros, and Barsamian 
continues this oppositional per-
spective: 
 
And so the conscious mind is more an 
impediment to experience than anything 
else, this intense filter, it’s kind of pa-
thetic, really. It’s pathetic in that people 
think it’s so powerful and in control, but 
it’s this chauvinism of consciousness 
that’s kind of evolved [9]. 
 
Ironically, it was the synergy 
between my experiencing Artifact 2010 and hearing the 
artist’s explanation of his thinking that had affected me 
powerfully. If I had read Barsamian’s interview in the 
New Scientist, I doubt it would have stayed with me. If I 
had viewed his work without hearing him explain his 
ideas, I wouldn’t have connected it so directly with my 
own experiences and reflections. As it is, his concepts 
take their place alongside the possible explanations of 
the function of phosphorescence as ways of thinking that 
have fuelled my sense of wonder, long after the event. 
Barsamian goes on to contend that “we are first and 
foremost blockers of experience. That’s how we survive, 
we take 20 million bits per second and narrow it down 
to 15 bits, and that’s how your mind can cope with it, at 
least on a conscious scale” [10]. The phrase “blockers of 
experience” troubled me, since the phenomenological 
enterprise is concerned with attending closely to one’s 
experience of the phenomenon in question. The Goe-
thean scientist strives for openness to the entity in all the 
ways that it reveals itself—sensorily, emotionally, intui-
tively, and cognitively. My whole approach to living and 
working on Blackstone is not to block experience.  
 
aybe, however, both things are true. The way 
that human cognition works is to be very se-
lective in processing sensory input, just as 









attempts to broaden and deepen human experiencing 
are a waste of time. It’s one of the difficulties of using 
mechanical language to describe the functioning of the 
brain—bits per second, band widths, information-pro-
cessing capacity and so on. The implication is that the 
limitations are hard-wired into the brain, and there’s 
little that can be done about this arrangement.  
Here, I’m moving into the knotty and much-dis-
puted “mind-brain problem.” Scientific knowledge of 
the neural pathways of human thinking, feeling, and 
action is being revolutionized [11]. Among the many 
new discoveries, it appears that in response to a situa-
tion, the centers that govern emotions and physical ac-
tion are activated before those that govern cognition. 
We may feel things and act upon them before we have 
time to think about them. The activity in the brain con-
cerned with developing a narrative sense of what hap-
pened occurs even later. There’s even the suggestion 
that the existence of a coherent will deciding to act in 
a situation is a convenient illusion, one of many useful 
self-deceptions carried out by the conscious mind [12].  
A key question is how much the new understand-
ing of the detailed physical and chemical processes oc-
curring in the brain tells us about human consciousness 
and the mind. Raymond Tallis, a leading clinical neu-
roscientist, notes the “present epidemic of neuro-pre-
fixed pseudo-disciplines” such as neuroeconomics, 
neurosociology and neurophilosophy [13]. Tallis has 
coined the term “neuromania” to describe the view that 
everyday human behavior can be entirely understood 
in neural terms [14]. While recognizing that neurosci-
ence has made it possible to treat brain disorders af-
fecting the personality, he shows that it cannot provide 
an adequate description of basic human characteristics 
such as intentionality, will, memory, and integrated 
awareness of perceptions, thoughts and emotions.  
This debate intersects in interesting ways with the 
place literature on which I have drawn. For example, 
David Abram’s emphasis on the emplaced body makes 
sense if much of our apprehension of a place through 
our senses bypasses cognition and enters the body di-
rectly. Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s notion of body-as-
subject gains further potency if our bodily responses 
occur before we are cognitively aware of them. As Tal-
lis points out, however, “Physical science is thus about 
the marginalization, and ultimately the elimination, of 
phenomenal appearance. But consciousness is centrally 
about appearance” [15]. It is a dangerous business, in 
other words, to use neuroscientific measurements to bol-
ster one’s position, as Barsamian arguably does, if the 
ultimate aim of the measurements is to provide an expla-
nation of what is happening in the brain that dismisses 
qualitative experience as being secondary [16].  
Warily, therefore, I find myself returning to the 
question: “What difference do these ideas and experi-
ences make for how one lives and acts in the everyday 
world?” 
 
his being the summer season, I swim in the sea 
every few days. I can scarcely enter the water 
without recalling my encounter with the phos-
phorescence. More precisely, the experience is affecting 
how I feel in the water. There is more than meets the eye. 
The tiny protozoa are presumably still there, though in 
lesser concentrations. In the daylight, of course, I can’t 
see them luminesce. Nor have I come across a repetition 
of that night’s splendor, just an occasional twinkle in a 
breaking wave as a faint reminder.  
I have had a lifelong affinity for immersing myself 
in water. My mother told me that when I was barely able 
to toddle, she took me to a neighborhood park beside a 
small lake. She turned away briefly, and when she 
looked back I had crawled straight across the beach into 
the water. She hauled me out spluttering, but I was un-
deterred. I made a beeline for the water at every oppor-
tunity that afternoon. Thereafter, every river, lake, and 
sea was an open invitation to dunk myself, regardless of 
temperature. On bushwalking trips I always sought to 
camp by water, and the hike was not complete without a 
swim.  
Because of the phosphorescence experience, the 
waters by my home feel more mysteriously alive, more 
of a communicative medium. Late on a hot, languid af-
ternoon, I floated on my back after swimming. With my 
arms and legs outstretched, head back, I felt physically 
supported, my skin tingling in the cool water. Then I had 
the unsettling feeling that there was an unspoken conver-
sation unfolding between my limbs and the enclosing 
brine. It was more reciprocal than previous experiences 
of feeling invigorated and renewed [17]. Why was it un-
settling? Perhaps because the sense of my body’s com-
munication, or communion, with the waters meant my 
understanding of what water was capable of was now in 
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question. Perhaps it was the presence of mystery where 
before there was uncomplicated physical enjoyment. 
My two experiences—phosphorescence and Arti-
fact 2010—commingle in my mind. The apparently 
limitless depths of the cosmos I saw in the strands of 
phosphorescence seem to symbolize the extent of the 
sensory world presenting itself to me every second. 
When I swim, I’m now more aware that my skin’s 
nerve endings are in contact with the sea water. My 
whole body is immersed in sense impressions and re-
sponding to the water. 
I’m musing again about attention [18]. For all my 
reservations about Barsamian’s ideas and mechanical 
metaphors for the mind, his representation of the lim-
ited nature of conscious thought in the face of the vast 
sensory flux has stayed with me. There is only so much 
attention to go round. It is limited and slow unless one 
can develop the all-encompassing attention of an ac-
complished spiritual practitioner. Where we place that 
attention becomes even more critical in view of the 
“mile-wide river of information flying by.” Relaxed 
multi-focussed attention centered in the body is im-
portant, but is it still only the equivalent of dipping 
several fingers into the river at once?  
Is it a paradox to say that my attention is drawn to 
the vastness I cannot directly apprehend? Perhaps, but 
surely people have always sought to peer beyond the 
apparent limits of human consciousness. It’s not an es-
oteric concern. The relationship between sensory data 
and conscious perceptions of the world is all about the 
experience of physical reality. If the body receives and 
responds to a flood of sensory impressions below the 
conscious level, anything that opens the gates of this 
part of the unconscious, even slightly, assumes greater 
significance. My efforts in Goethean science can be 
seen as one way among many for developing one’s ca-
pacity to experience a natural phenomenon more 
fully—to complement rational thought with imagina-
tive and intuitive faculties that are not usually accessed 
by consciousness. 
 
t is a warm afternoon. The southwesterly breeze 
has dropped. The waters are calling, or so I imag-
ine. The memory of the phosphorescence lingers, 
the impossibility of it, the sense of play. The power of 
one mysterious night of illumination has infused my eve-
ryday feeling for water. I wonder about all the other 
realms of Blackstone—the land, the winds, the invita-
tions from all the life forms of this place that pass me by 
each day. The opportunities are endless. 
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